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The paper sets out three aspects of an agenda for
Sociology in the 21st Century. First, sociology
needs to develop its central concerns beyond
those of Marx, Weber and Durkheim and engage
with the questions posed by gender and ethnic as
well as class relations. Secondly, sociology needs
to move beyond selflimitation to the nation-state,
and engage with the analysis of the developing
European Union and also globalisation. Thirdly,
sociology should be proud of its place in the
Enlightenment tradition, further develop its
scientific methods, and not retreat into relativism.
Sylvia Walby  is professor at the Department of Sociology and Social Policy, University of
Leeds, UK and former president of the European Sociological Association (1995-1997).
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Introduction
The creation of a new programme of so-
ciology is an occasion to be marked with
much celebration. Sociology can make
important contributions to society and
to the development of knowledge. I
shall address some, though obviously
not all, of the debates as to the future
development of sociology.
Firstly, sociology needs to move de-
cisively beyond the problematic of class
and industrial society which is the focus
of our traditional canon of Marx, Weber
and Durkheim. This classical tradition
neglects the analysis of other deeply in-
stitutionalised social divisions and in-
equalities, especially those of gender
and of ethnicity. This trilogy of classical
writers has never been adequate for
sociological enquiry; this insufficiency
is not merely new. For instance, femi-
nist sociology at the turn of the century
was represented by analysts such as
Charlotte Perkins Gilman. In order to
develop within the academy Women’s
Studies has forged a separate intellec-
tual space, such was the insufficiency
of traditional sociology. One of our
questions now is what should be the
relationship between sociology and
Women’s Studies in a newly forming
sociology programme. How are the
questions raised by a gender analysis
to be re-integrated into sociology?
Secondly, sociology should address
the challenge of the increasing integra-
tion of the European Union (EU) and
play its part in the social analysis which
underpins the creation of new Euro-
pean institutions. Whatever one’s view
of the EU, it exists and is developing,
indeed whichever way Denmark votes
in the referendum on the Treaty of Am-
sterdam. The failure of the voices and
analysis of sociology to be heard ade-
quately within the debates on the EU
indicates a structural weakness in the
institutional form of sociology. More
analyses and institutional connections
need to be made. The EU itself cannot
be understood outside of the wider
context of the debates on globalisation.
The significance of this European ques-
tion has been one of the reasons behind
the creation of the European Sociologi-
cal Association. This association was
formed just after the wall came down
between East and West in Europe, and
these various transformations are at the
heart of its intellectual project.
Thirdly, sociology should embrace
the definition of itself as scientific in its
methodology, and not let modesty and
humility about the frailty and imperfec-
tions of social science knowledge, nor
the sometimes politically horrendous
uses to which it has been put, detract
from this. We are in danger of allowing
relativism and culturalism diminish the
potential contribution of sociology to
knowledge and to society. The improve-
ment of knowledge by systematic en-
quiry and data collection about the soci-
al, not merely the textual, world, as well
as theoretical development is a necessa-
ry feature of this. We could be bolder
about our knowledge claims and devel-
op the methodologies that we use to
support them.
Revising the canon: Including
gender and ethnicity
Is there a traditional core to sociology
with which most sociologists would
agree? Is there a canon of classic writers
which all students should read? Insofar
as there is one in practice, it is, perhaps,
Marx, Weber and Durkheim, with a few
additions which are quite variable. The-
se are writers who have addressed ques -
tions of the relationship of individual to
society; social inequality and social
cohesion; and, in particular, the rela-
tionship of class and the dynamics of
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industrialisation. But there is a key
limitation, that of the focus on a nar-
row range of social divisions, social
inequalities, especially, that of class at
the expense of gender and of ethnicity.
That is not to say that there are not
new versions of the old questions. In
particular there is a vast agenda in re-
searching and thinking through the is-
sues around the transformation of
work, in understanding the future of
work, as it is shaped by the new infor-
mation technologies, by the changed
gender composition of the workforce,
and the powers of global markets. What
will be the nature of jobs - more skilled
using educated labour in the knowledge
based industries, or decreasingly skil-
led in the context of globally mobile ca-
pital searching for cheap labour?
However, if there is a modern core
to sociology it is perhaps rather the tri-
logy of concepts of class, gender and
ethnicity.
Ethnicity has always been an impor-
tant issue for countries, sometimes defi-
ning the group seeking a state in which
to institutionalise a nation; sometimes
a beleaguered migrant minority; always
forming and reforming, despite myths
of continuity and asserted essential na-
ture. This will continue to be a vibrant
area for sociology, with the reconstruc-
tion of nation-states in both East and
West Europe; and the increasingly visi-
bility of diaspora and their linkages
around the world (Gilroy 1987; Yuval-
Davis and Anthias 1989; Rex and Tom-
linson 1979; Phizacklea and Miles 1980;
Phizacklea 1990).
Gender has become a major theme
in sociology over the last 25 years and
should continue to be a dynamic field
in the next century (Barrett 1990; Cock-
burn 1983; Delphy 1984; Oakley 1974;
Phizacklea 1990; Reskin and Roos 1990;
Skocpol 1992; Walby 1986, 1990, 1997).
The transformation of gender relations,
not only in the UK and most of the in-
dustrialised world, as women, in highly
uneven ways, enter the public world of
employment and more slowly state po-
litics, and yet do not seem to reach full
equality will, and should be, a site of
much research (Walby 1997). These are
major transformations, yet we have on-
ly begun to collect the data and develop
the concepts needed to understand both
the sweep of the changes and their situ-
ated specificities. For instance, we do
not yet have in many countries, even
as we approach the millennium, data
on the extent to which men use violence
against women. We do not yet really un-
derstand the complex implications of
the entry of women to the public sphere
for women who are differently situated
in the macro transformations of the
forms of gender regime.
Sociology has been one of the disci-
plines which as been most welcoming
of gender analyses and has benefited
from the intellectual vitality as a conse-
quence. However, there are still areas
of gender relations where there is much
still to do. Most social life is gendered
and there are further areas of sociologi-
cal analyses which should include gen-
der more prominently. In some places
the questions and concepts of feminist
analysis are finding their way into
mainstream sociology, in other places
it remains segregated as a specialist to-
pic.
It is sometimes said that ‘essentia-
lism’ and ‘difference’ are the key deba-
tes in gender studies, in the sociology
of gender (Butler 1990; Spellman 1988).
That is, the debates on how to concep-
tualise and analyse the differences be-
tween the genders without falling into
the trap of essentialising the categories
and ending up with a biologically, or
even socially, based essentialism. And
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how to analyse the differences between
women, so that the category ‘woman’
is not treated incorrectly as a monolithic
whole, with the ensuing problems of
this being presumed to be a whole ba-
sed on the norm of the white Western
woman (Carby 1987). These debates are
often run together, since the accusation
is that ‘essentialist’ accounts cannot
deal adequately with ‘difference’.
The debate over the analysis of dif-
ference stemmed from the need to avoid
the charges of false universalism, of
over generalising from the experiences
of white Western women. This has led
to a lot of self-criticism among writers
on gender. While the general critique,
of avoiding falsely universalising from
the position of one’s own ethnicity, is
valid, and indeed might be more widely
addressed within other branches of so-
ciology, I think the field needs to beco-
me more outward looking. For instance,
rather than the tendency to focus on lo-
cal case studies, based on a presump-
tion of the lack of comparability be-
tween patterns and experiences of gen-
der relations in different cultures, we
might engage in explicit comparative
work, to explicitly assess the extent to
which there are differences and similari-
ties. Further, while mainstream socio-
logy has started to engage with the rath-
er large research agenda of globalisa-
tion we have as yet seen little attempt
to gender this debate, despite the very
lively debates about women in develop-
ment (Mies 1986). Thus, gender and glo-
balisation could provide a rich teaching
and research agenda, integrating con-
cerns with difference, gender and glo-
balisation.
The related debate of essentialism
has also often taken a rather negative
tone, with this term being direcred in
an extremely critical manner at those
who have engaged in generalisations
and large-scale theorising (Butler 1990;
Yuval-Davis 1997). I think we should
not neglect the extent to which critical
feminist theory opened up the analysis
of the relationship between the social
and the biological, the human and natu-
re, especially in analyses of motherhood
(Oakley 1974), sexuality (Dworkin
1981), violence (Brownmiller 1976; Mac-
Kinnon 1989). These are studies and
theories to be build on, again a fruitful
area of overlap between feminist and
sociological interests, where each has
much to contribute to the debate of the
other.
I think there is a need to remember
to keep the field open and broad, to in-
clude all six of my domains/structures
employment, household, state, cultural
institutions, violence and sexuality and
to avoid an agenda which prioritises
one at the expense of the other.
Finally, I think we need analyses of
change in the structure of gender rela-
tions, not only how they are experien-
ced in everyday life, but at the macro-
level analysis of structural changes too.
We need large-scale macro-theorising,
using large concepts, not only specific
case studies of situated gendered prac-
tices, using concepts such as patriarchy,
or gender regime. We need to develop
the work on different forms of gender
relations and on the social/natural
boundary. We need to understand the
impact of the various dimensions of glo-
balisation, on women not only in devel-





The analysis of Europe, and in particu-
lar, the EU, is important for sociology,
but it is currently a much neglected
area. The EU is important for sociolo-
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gists particularly for its distinctive and
under-examined social powers. At the
moment most of the academic analy-
ses of the EU are performed by other
disciplines, especially political science,
economics and social policy, leaving the
extent and potential of the social pow-
ers of the EU under analysed. There is
an important agenda for sociology here.
The EU is, of course, only one part of
Europe and there is a further important
agenda for teaching and research on the
transformations or transitions currently
taking place in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope after the collapse of communist re-
gimes. Here, however, only the EU will
be addressed.
The unusual nature of the EU is per-
haps one of the reasons for a lack of ap-
preciation of its powers. State theory
may need to be rewritten in the light of
this experience. The EU defies most
conventional state theory in at least two
major ways. Firstly, it does not have the
means of violence, either internally or
externally. For instance, according to
Weber (1947), states have a monopoly
of legitimate violence in a given territo-
ry. The EU clearly does not, since it does
not have its own armies, militia or po-
lice. Attempts to create a military arm
(e.g. the European Defence Community
in the early 1950s) have failed (Kaptyen
1996).
Secondly, the EU does not build a
welfare state using powers of tax and
spend, although many contemporary
European conceptions of the nation-sta-
te include a notion of welfare, in which
the community, or society, as represen-
ted in the nation, or nation-state ‘looks
after its own’ when they are unable to
do so themselves as an essential ele-
ment (Banting 1995; Habermas 1987;
Lange 1992; Ross 1995; Swaan 1994; Tit-
muss 1974). The EU has exceedingly li-
mited powers to tax and spend (except
for the Common Agricultural Policy
and Structural Funds to support regio-
nal policy), and Member States have a
near monopoly on state provided wel-
fare.
Indeed as a consequence, there is a
question as to whether the EU is a state
or merely an inter-governmental coali-
tion. On the one hand it can be argued
that the EU merely follows the bidding
of its Member States and thus is not a
state in its own right, and on the other
that the European Court of Justice and
the European Commission act in a man-
ner sufficiently autonomously from the
Member States and develop policies
which are neither the average, nor the
lowest common denominator, but in ad-
vance of Member States, so that the de-
signation supra-state is more appro-
priate.
It is within the debates on globalisa-
tion that the interest in the expansion
and effectivity of the social powers of
the EU are currently centred. The deba-
tes on globalisation have raised the
question of the capacity of nation-states
to act in the face of global markets. Is
the EU able to establish a distinctive set
of social powers, or are such state-based
policies not possible in a globalising eco-
nomy? Can the EU withstand globalisa-
tion?
This question requires an evaluation
of the social powers of the EU. This is
needed to assess the extent to which
globalisation has eroded the power of
political entities to develop social poli-
cies. It is through the social dimension
that the capacity of the EU to effect pat-
terns of social exclusion is potentially
deployed. Yet the social dimension is
often regarded as weak and relatively
ineffectual in the face of European capi-
tal (Hantrais 1995; Streeck 1995; Streeck
and Schmitter 1992; Bornschier and
Ziltener 1998). I think that the social po-
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wers of the EU are underestimated in
current social theory for three main
reasons:
Firstly, most analysts have a too nar-
row definition of the social dimension
or social policy. This is too often seen
solely in terms of welfare programmes
based on issues of social need, on poli-
cies of tax and spend, which indeed are
rather lacking in the EU. But, though
important, programmes of social distri-
bution are not the only routes through
which a strategy for social justice can
be pursued.
Secondly, there has been insufficient
regard to forms of social inequality and
social exclusion other than class, such
as that of gender inequality. Most of the
analyses have examined traditional is-
sues of class inequality and the relations
between capital and labour. Yet it is
within the areas of equal opportunities
between women and men, the regula-
tion of pollution and the environment,
that some of the most innovative poli-
cies have been developed.
Thirdly, sociologists have often un-
derestimated the power of law in the
EU. The Treaties are a de facto, if not
de jure, constitution of the EU, and thus
of its Member States and in consequen-
ce have considerable power. The legal
mechanisms whereby these Treaties ha-
ve so much power rest not only on the
requirement that governments must re-
vise their domestic legislation to come
into line with the Treaties and Directi-
ves, but also, and more importantly, the
doctrine of ‘direct effect’ whereby the
Treaties and all binding EU instru-
ments, such as Directives, impact di-
rectly on all individual citizens of the
EU. The doctrine of ‘direct effect’ means
that individuals can appeal directly to
the Treaties and Directives of the EU
without having to wait for Member Sta-
tes to take intervening domestic legisla-
tive reform to comply with the EU (Cur-
tin 1989; Pillinger 1992; Weiler 1997).
An example of the power of the EU
is that of the legal floor for equal oppor-
tunities policies in employment (Hos-
kyns 1997). Based on Article 119 of the
Treaty of Rome and subsequent Directi-
ves, this policy has created many im-
portant changes in policies relating to
gender relations in employment from
ending the marriage bar in Ireland in
the mid 1970s to its impact on the wages
gap between full-time women and men
workers in the UK. Clearly there are sig-
nificant differences in the impact of such
EU policies between Member States, de-
pending on issues such as the nature of
the prevailing gender regime and the
strength of a feminist lobby, which lead
to major differences in the implications
of such policies between, for instance,
the UK and Denmark. The exact nature
of the impact of these regulatory poli-
cies is thus a question for further re-
search.
The analysis of the reaction of the
EU to perceived globalisation is impor-
tant for analyses of globalisation. The
EU is a polity which has responded ag-
gressively to the perceived threat of glo-
balisation. It is no passive victim in the
manner often suggested for nation-sta-
tes within globalisation theory. During
this process the strength of this polity
has grown considerably, becoming a ful-
ly fledged supra-state, developing new
policy capabilities, sometimes at the ex-
pense of the sovereignty and capacity
for action of its Member States. The EU
has demonstrated a response to globali-
sation in which a polity has been signifi-
cantly reconfigured and aggrandised.
The future development of this process,
for instance, with the single European
currency, poses further questions for so-
ciological analysis.
However, the EU is not a traditional
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state. It does not have the full range of
traditional state powers, such as its own
apparatus for organised violence, such
as policing and external military enga-
gements. It is a regulatory state.
The legal powers of the EU have
been used to take forward projects of
social justice by women, as well as con-
sumer protection, environmental pro-
tection and matters of health and safety
of workers. These have been advanced
further than has been possible within
their Member States alone. They have
been most effective when social and
political groups have actively reached
over the heads of their national govern-
ments to utilise European Union legal
instruments. How far can this process
go? Is it limited to particular policy do-
mains? What will be the impact of other
regulatory dimensions of the EU, such
as its fiscal regime?
This analysis and agenda does not
require us to underestimate the extent
to which the drive by employers to see
the completion of the Single European
Market is a project of deregulation.
Clearly there are important issues in the
restructuring of the balance of class for-
ces in the EU project. But a full under-
standing of the impact of the social di-
mension will only be reached if we broa-
den the range of social issues conside-
red central to the analysis of social ex-
clusion so that it includes not only is-
sues related to class and economic mar-
ginality, but also ethnicity and age, and,
especially, that of gender. Further, the
social dimension is relevant to the shap-
ing of the market and the economy as a






Sociology has undergone much self
searching criticism about its relation-
ship to the Enlightenment tradition in
which improved knowledge and the
advance of science are linked to social
progress. I think that sociology should
vigorously embrace one part of this,
that of scientific methods. In order to
argue this I reject the tendency to con-
flate the notion of the body of scientific
knowledge with that of scientific me-
thod. Sociology should be proud of and
develop its scientific methods. I want
to defend scientific methods from the
attacks by an unholy alliance of Fou-
cault and feminism.
Foucault (e.g. 1981) and feminism
(e.g. Merchant 1980) attack a specific re-
presentation of the body of scientific
knowledge. They attack it for represen-
ting authority, for being a set of beliefs
which are passed off as, represented as,
or believed to be true as a result of po-
wer. This knowledge is itself power, or
at least a vehicle for power. The examp-
les which are given significantly over-
lap: Psychiatry (an early target was cri-
tiques of Freud, Millett, Firestone), qua-
si-medicalised social interventions, in-
stitutions to discipline and punish;
though there are some variations, in
particular, the feminist analysis of eco-
logy and development in the Third
World (such as the work of Shiva 1989).
There is now a significant position with-
in the sociology of science which sees
science as merely yet another social in-
stitution, developing this analysis be-
yond the work of Kuhn on the social
dimensions of scientific community and
the circumstances of scientific revolu-
tions, to the relativism of Latour.
While I agree that much social scien-
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ce asks questions which are dispropor-
tionately those which interest dominant
social groups, and that it is enmeshed
and riddled with power, I think that the
relativist alternative of relinquishing of
the possibility of establishing procedu-
res for improving knowledge, is to be
rejected. We need to distinguish be-
tween a critique of the power to have
the resources to investigate questions
from that of the methods of enquiry.
Further, it is not clear that Foucault’s
absent alternative belief system, religi-
on, which was previously the dominant
one, was any the less riddled with po-
wer, in fact, perhaps more so.
It might be suggested that the alter-
native is to engage in critical theory, and
following Habermas (1987), argue for
the development of the ideal speech si-
tuation within which truer knowledge
may be created. However, Habermas is
more interested in setting up the condi-
tions for adequate public debate, to re-
vitalise the public sphere, than in the
methods of science and social science.
As such his conditions for establishing
the conditions for effective communica-
tion do not include some of those neces-
sary for effective science, in particular
his work does not have systematic refe-
rence to the need to systematically gath-
er empirical data, which is a key featu-
re of scientific method.
Underlying many of the problems
with much of this debate on sociology
and science is the use of too general and
too broad a definition of ‘science’. It has
become defined as the entire edifice of
dominant knowledge in Western socie-
ties. I think it is better to conceptually
separate this notion from that of scienti-
fic method, a much narrower notion re-
lating to scientific procedure. The over-
all body of knowledge is, obviously,
shaped by and implicated in dominant
power relations. There are two ways in
particular. First, the choice of research
topics to be funded, by big business re-
search and development, by govern-
ment departments, and only marginally
by academics whose opportunities are
themselves affected by opportunities
for jobs and resources. Secondly, the dis-
semination of findings, especially in the
media is a thoroughly social construc-
tionist concern, as for instance Faludi
(1992) has shown in the differential pu-
blicity to research findings which sup-
ported anti-feminist and feminist politi-
cal conclusions.
The matter of the research methods
is a different one. Of course, here it can
be argued that some methods are con-
structed in a masculinist way, in parti-
cular modes of abstraction, such as
theorising and the use of statistics, rath-
er than focusing on women’s own direct
accounts (Stanley and Wise 1983), for
instance as given by in-depth interviews
(Oakley 1981) and ethnographies. Here
we see the feminist concern with the
patriarchal bias in the methods of the
academy, and of the deeply patriarchal
nature of existing modes systems of ab-
stract thinking and disciplines, and a
belief that knowledge possessed by
‘ordinary’ women is less ‘contaminated’
by these patriarchal biases since it is clo-
ser to direct experience. This view of
knowledge is based implicitly or expli-
citly upon a notion of feminist stand-
point epistemology (Harding 1986).
I profoundly disagree with this. Not
that social science is not, still, deeply
structured around priorities which di-
minish women’s concerns - it is. But
that direct experience is any the less af-
fected by these processes than academic
procedures. Everyday experience is al-
so affected by the patriarchal structur-
ing of knowledge, as demonstrated by
much feminist cultural studies (Frank-
lin, Lury and Stacey 1991).
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I will take the example of male violence
against women. Clearly there is still a
problem in the structure of research
funding priorities since we do not yet
know basic information about the na-
ture and extent of male violence against
women even as we approach the millen-
nium, while we know in the finest mi-
nutiae issues of men’s concerns such as
that of the nature and extent of men’s
paid work. That is, I endorse the femi-
nist critique of the priorities given to
the research funding. But I do not think
that qualitative accounts provided by
some women who have been abused
can, even though necessary, be sufficient
to provide answers to the question of
the overall nature and extent of such
violence. Everyday knowledge about
violence is also influenced by patriar-
chally structured cultural institutions.
Many women, like most men, have little
access to knowledge about violence
other than that from popular culture,
such as newspapers which carry po-
pular mythology about rape and other
violence against women, such as the no-
tion that rape is committed by stran-
gers, rather than men the women know
(Soothill and Walby 1991). They are less
likely than social scientists to call forced
sex ‘rape’ probably because this word
is so stigmatised; and when asked for
causes of domestic violence are more
likely to report their own immediate ac-
tion, such as the dinner not being ready,
than to turn to theories of male domi-
nance.
In this context there is a clear place
and need for scientific method; for ri-
gorous research methods. This is neces-
sary in order to go beyond particulari-
stic knowledge; beyond the myths of
newspaper editors and popular know-
ledge. Such methods are necessary in
order to establish knowledge which has
a closer consistency with the external
world, because it is based on systematic
and rigorous empirical enquiry.
Sociology should teach and practice
rigorous research methods. This inclu-
des the systematic collection, sifting,
sorting, analysis of data and its use in
building coherent and consistent con-
ceptual and theoretical knowledge. This
is a scientific practice which is question-
ing, based on forever trying to prove
others wrong, on the search for constant
improvement. Scientific knowledge is
constantly changing and being replaced
by other knowledge based on further
research. I think this more adequately
represents scientific method than the
accounts such as those of Foucault and
Merchant imply. Does this produce
truth? I do not think that any scientist
thinks they produce other than provi-
sional knowledge, knowledge which is
constantly subject to doubt and error,
and to improvement. The accusation of
hubris directed at scientists is generally
misplaced, although there are excep-
tions, especially when scientists are
searching for research funds and re-
presenting themselves as the best. Am
I saying that Foucault is wrong to alle-
ge that the human sciences are utilised
to support power, that they constitute
a form of power? Yes and no. Yes in that
those in power call upon the human sci-
ences as a form of authoritative know-
ledge and yes in that we do have new
modalities of power based on these bo-
dies of knowledge which are articulated
through surveillance and in particular
through quasi-medicalised discourse of
benefit. But this fails to recognise the
pluralism and internal critique within
the sciences which is a product, indeed
necessary part, of their method of pro-
cedure, their method of establishing a
more authoritative claim to knowledge.
The representation of scientists as clai-
ming that they have finally found the
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truth is wrong, since, here more than in
other practices for creating knowledge,
findings and methods are constantly in-
terrogated. They do not describe ‘reali-
ty’ in a definitive way, but merely at the
moment are likely to be less wrong that
others in relation to the specific ques-
tions that they ask. This scientific know-
ledge will always be flawed; the theori-
es will always be modified, hopefully
constantly and rapidly; that is the natu-
re of the scientific project.
In many of the critiques of science
there is a problematic tendency to con-
flate the overall body of knowledge and
scientific method (cf. Merchant 1980).
Rather this separation needs to be clear-
ly maintained. Only then can we ad-
dress separately the issues in each. Un-
derstanding of the social nature of sci-
entific communities is no reason for the
relativisation of all knowledge claims.
Modern statistics, and, perhaps mo-
re importantly, the computers which we
operate to use them are immensely mo-
re powerful and thus capable of subtlety
than before. Large scale data sets are
generally under-utilised by sociologists
and with them a tendency to cede cer-
tain intellectual questions to other dis-
ciplines unnecessarily. There is a ten-
dency to cede areas to disciplines such
as economics and with it the contribu-
tion of sociology to our understanding
of important areas of social life, espe-
cially that of work. In the UK sociology
once made central contributions to the
analysis of employment; this is now
much less frequent, with such work ta-
king place more frequently in the ex-
panding management schools and in
the economics departments, while so-
ciologists move towards analysis of cul-
ture. We should reclaim this territory.
Our theoretical insights are needed. For
instance, economic markets need to be
analysed as social institutions rooted in
social contexts. The fledgling democra-
cies in the East need sociologists as
much as economists to analyse their
transformations.
Many sociologists are insufficiently
unaware of the new capabilities for data
handling. This now includes the hand-
ling of qualitative as well as quantita-
tive data. Many of the problems pre-
viously identified are very significantly
reduced by the power of the new tech-
nology. We should reclaim it as a tool,
subordinate to the questions of socio-
logy.
Future agendas
Canon and core: Sociology needs to de-
velop its central concerns beyond those
predominant in the work of the nine-
teenth century sociologists which have
become our canon. We need to move
beyond the work of Marx, Weber and
Durkheim. In particular we need to ad-
dress the questions posed by gender
and ethnicity as well as those of class.
We need a sociology which addres-
ses the questions of our time and which
is robust enough not to cede the analysis
of the economy to economics, of the po-
lity to political science, and of the cul-
tural to literary studies.
Beyond the nation-state :  The time in
which it was appropriate for sociology
to be bounded by the nation-state in
which it is located is, if ever appropri-
ate, now over. The inter-linkages be-
tween nation-states, especially with the
development of the EU and other regio-
nal groupings, and the process of globa-
lisation, mean that the spatial scale re-
levant to the analysis is now much ex-
tended.
This is leading to new forms of insti-
tutionalisation of sociology, such as the
development of the European Sociolo-
gical Association, and new forms of the
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communication, such as the Internet.
We can expect the increasing interna-
tionalisation and speed of exchange of
sociological work.
The Enlightenment Tradition: Sociology
should embrace and develop a range
of scientific research methods. It should
be proud of its place in the Enlighten-
ment heritage. The methods selected
should, of course, be selected simply on
the grounds that they are the best ones
to investigate the questions asked.
The analysis of the pressing ques-
tions of our day requires sociology, not
only the sociological imagination, but
sociology as a scientific enquiry.
Bibliography
Barrett, M. 1980: Women’s Oppression
Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist
Analysis. London: Verso.
Banting, K. 1995: “The welfare state as
statecraft: Territorial politics and Ca-
nadian social policy”, in Leibfried,
S. and Pierson, P. (eds.): European So-
cial Policy: Between Fragmentation and
Integration. Washington DC: Broo-
kings: 269-300.
Bornschier, V. and Ziltener, P. 1998 (in
press): “The revitalization of We-
stern Europe and the politics of the
‘social dimension’”, in Boje, T.,
Steenbergen B. van and Walby, S.
(eds.) European Societies: Fusion or
Fission? London: Routledge.
Brah, A. 1991: “Questions of Difference
and International Feminism”, in
Aaron, J. and Walby, S. (eds.) Out of
the Margins: Women’s Studies in the
Nineties. London: Falmer Press: 168-
176.
Butler, J. 1990: Gender Trouble: Feminism
and the Subversion of Identity. New
York: Routledge.
Brownmiller, S. 1976: Against Our Will.
London: Penguin.
Carby, H. 1987: “White women listen!”,
in Centre for Contemporary Cultural
Studies. The Empire Fights Back. Lon-
don: Hutchinson.
Cecchini, P., Catinat, M. and Jacquemin
A. 1988: The European Challenge 1992:
The Benefits of a Single Market. Alder-
shot: Gower.
Cockburn, C. 1983: Brothers: Male Domi-
nance and Technological Change. Lon-
don: Pluto Press.
Curtin, D. 1989: Irish Employment Equali-
ty Law. Dublin: Round Hall Press.
Delphy, C. 1984: Close to Home: A Ma-
terialist Analysis of Women’s Oppres-
sion. London: Hutchinson.
Dworkin, A. 1981: Pornography. London:
Women’s Press.
Faludi, S. 1992: Backlash: The Undeclared
War Against Women. London: Chato
and Windus.
Foucault, M. 1981: The History of Sexuali-
ty, Volume One: An Introduction. Har-
mondsworth: Pelican.
Franklin, S., Lury, C. and Stacey, J. (eds.)
1991: Off-Centre: Feminism and Cultu-
ral Studies. London: Harper Collins.
Gilman, C. P. 1966 [1898]: Women and
Economics: A Study of the Economic
Relation Between Men and Women as
a Factor in Social Evolution.  New
York: Harper and Row.
Gilroy, P. 1987: There Ain’t No Black in
the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics
of Race and Nation. London: Hutchin-
son.
Habermas, J. 1987 [1981]: The Theory of
Communicative Action Volume 2: Life-
world and System: A Critique of Func-
tionalist Reason. Cambridge: Polity.
Hanmer, J. and Saunders, S. 1984: Well
Founded Fear: A Community Study of
Violence Toward Women.  London:
Hutchinson.
Hantrais, L. 1995: Social Policy in the Eu-
ropean Union. Basingstoke: Macmil-
lan.
26
Harding, S. 1986: The Science Question
in Feminism. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press.
Held, D. 1995: Democracy and the Global
Order: From the Modern State to Cos-
mopolitan Governance. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. 1996: Globa-
lization in Question: The International
Economy and the Possibilities of Govern-
ance. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hoskyns, C. 1996: Integrating Gender:
Women, Law and Politics in the Euro-
pean Union. London: Verso.
Kapteyn, P. 1996: The Stateless Market:
The European Dilemma of Integration
and Civilization. London: Routledge.
Lange, P. 1992: “The politics of the social
dimension”, in Sbragia, M.A. (ed.)
Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policy-
making in the “New” European Com-
munity. Washington DC: Brookings:
225-256.
Leibfried, S. and Pierson, P. (eds.) 1995:
European Social Policy: Between Frag-
mentation and Integration. Washing-
ton DC: Brookings.
Mackinnon, C. 1989: Toward a Feminist
Theory of the State. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Merchant, C. 1980: The Death of Nature:
Women, Ecology and the Scientific Re-
volution . New York: Harper and
Row.
Mies, M. 1986: Patriarchy and Accumula-
tion on a World Scale: Women in the
International Division of Labour.  Lon-
don: Zed Books.
Nicholson, L. (ed.) 1990: Feminism/Post-
modernism. New York: Routledge.
Oakley, A. 1974: The Sociology of House-
work. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Oakley, A. 1981: “Interviewing women:
a contradiction in terms”, in Roberts,
H. (ed.) Doing Feminist Research. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Phizacklea, A. 1990: Unpacking the Fas-
hion Industry . London: Routledge.
Phizacklea, A. and Miles, R. 1980: La-
bour and Racism. London: Routledge.
Pillinger, J. 1992: Feminising the Market:
Women’s Pay and Employment in the
European Community. Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
Reskin, B. and Roos, P. 1990: Job Queues,
Gender Queues: Explaining Women’s
Inroads into Male Occupations. Phila-
delphia: Temple University Press.
Rex, J. and Tomlinson, S. 1979: Colonial
Immigrants in a British City: A Class
Analysis. London: Routledge.
Ross, G. 1995: “Assessing the Delors era
and social policy”, in Leibfried, S.
and Pierson, P. (eds.) European Social
Policy: Between Fragmentation and In-
tegration . Washington DC: Broo-
kings: 357-388.
Swaan, A. de 1994: “Perspectives for
transnational social policy in Euro-
pe: Social transfers from West to
East”, in Swaan, A. de (ed.) Social
Policy Beyond Borders: The Social Ques-
tion in International Perspective. Am-
sterdam University Press: 101-115.
Segal, L. 1987: Is the Future Female? Troub-
led Thoughts on Contemporary Femi-
nism. London: Virago.
Shiva, V. 1989: Staying Alive: Women,
Ecology and Development. London:
Zed Press.
Soothill, K. and Walby, S. 1991: Sex Cri-
me in the News. London: Routledge.
Spellman, E. 1988: Inessential Woman:
Problems of Exclusion in Feminist
Thought. Boston: Beacon Press.
Stanley, L. and Wise, S. 1983: Breaking
Out: Feminist Consciousness and Femi-
nist Research. London: Routledge.
Streeck, W. 1995: “From market making
to state building? Reflections on the
political economy of European soci-
al policy”, in Leibfried, S. and Pier-
son, P. (eds.): European Social Policy:
Between Fragmentation and Integra-
27
tion . Washington DC: Brookings:
389-431.
Streeck, W. and Schmitter, P.C. 1992:
“From national corporatism to trans-
national pluralism: Organised in-
terests in the single European Mar-
ket”, in Streeck, W. Social Institutions
and Economic Performance: Studies of
Industrial Relations in Advanced Eco-
nomies. London: Sage.
Tinker, I. (ed.) 1990: Persistent Inequali-
ties: Women and World Development.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Therborn, G. 1998 (in press): “Europe”,
in Boje, T., Steenbergen, B. van and
Walby, S. (eds.) European Societies:
Fusion or Fission? London: Routled-
ge.
Titmuss, R. M. 1974: Social Policy: An In-
troduction. London: Allen and Unwin.
Touraine, A. 1998 (in press): “Europe be-
tween integration and fragmenta-
tion”, in Boje, T., Steenbergen, B. van
and Walby, S. (eds.) European Socie-
ties: Fusion or Fission? London: Rout-
ledge.
Walby, S. 1986: Patriarchy at Work. Cam-
bridge: Polity.
Walby, S. 1990: Theorizing Patriarchy. Ox-
ford: Blackwell.
Walby, S. 1997: Gender Transformations.
London: Routledge.
Weber, M. 1947: The Theory of Economic
and Social Organization. New York:
Free Press.
Weiler, J.H.H. 1997: “The reformation
of European Constitutionalism”.
Journal of Common Market Studies, 35
(1): 97-129.
Yuval-Davis, N. and Anthias, F. (eds.)
1989: Woman-Nation-State. London:
Macmillan.
